



**COMMUNISTS  
AND  
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The first Irish Communist Party was formed in October 1921, midway between the truce that ended the War of Independence and the treaty that precipitated civil war. Earlier attempts at getting a CP off the ground had been stymied by a combination of the reformist leaders of James Connolly's old Socialist Party, who refused to relinquish control, and the sheer magnitude of military repression that marked the Tan War.

The truce provided an opening, but October 1921 was an inauspicious time to be launching a revolutionary socialist party. The revolutionary tide, not just in Ireland but worldwide, had already turned, and the infant Communist Party faced an uphill struggle on all fronts.

When the terms of the Treaty were published in December 1921, the CP called immediately for its rejection, arguing that the proposed Free State was not a step towards the Republic as the treatyites claimed, but the spearhead of a counter-revolution in Ireland that would save British imperialism from defeat by elevating to power the most ruthless elements of Ireland's capitalist class who would soon unleash 'social hell'.<sup>1</sup>

In its opposition to the treaty, the CP didn't specifically mention partition, but it was their clear understanding that partition and the Free State were twin elements in imperialism's grand design for retaining control of Ireland and that the way to defeat

imperialism—and with it partition—was to overthrow the Free State.

To the communists it seemed a swift victory was still possible, although with only thirty or so active members, the party was in no position to assume leadership of a renewed struggle. But if they could spur the IRA—with tens of thousands of predominantly working-class supporters—to restart the fight, they believed they could then push the struggle in a socially radical direction, culminating in a socialist Workers' Republic.<sup>2</sup>

This was certainly an ambitious strategy for such a small and inexperienced party, but in pursuing it the CPI had the full support of the Communist International, the Comintern, with which it had affiliated at the outset.

In fact, even before the CPI was formed, two of its leaders-in-waiting, Roddy Connolly and Eamonn MacAlpine, had attended the second Comintern Congress in Moscow in 1920, coming away with Lenin's 'Theses on the National and Colonial Question' which obliged them, like all communists working in imperialist-dominated countries, to form temporary tactical alliances with revolutionary nationalist movements.<sup>3</sup>

This hadn't been the Irish delegates' initial perspective. At the congress, before Lenin pronounced, they had argued *against* any close relationship with republicans, seeing the IRA not as a potential ally but simply as a source for recruitment. Significantly, too, they had argued that the objective of an Irish CP when formed should be 'a Federated Workers' Republic of Great Britain and Ireland' and not the separate *Irish* Workers' Republic they later advocated.<sup>4</sup>

This initial reluctance to take a clear stand for national independence went hand in hand with a seriously flawed attitude to Protestant workers in the North. The antipathy of such workers to Irish nationalism was seen by Connolly and MacAlpine as a *positive* factor for the advancement of communism. They argued that the task facing them in Ulster was 'much easier' than in the rest of Ireland, because the lack of any nationalist republican feeling on the part

of the majority of the proletariat renders them hostile to the establishment of an Irish bourgeois republic... [and so it would] be possible to rally the proletariat to their banner on the straight issue of the capitalist state versus the proletarian state.<sup>5</sup>

Just how flawed this analysis was, was revealed within days of Connolly and MacAlpine's address to the Comintern, when the Unionist bosses in Belfast unleashed a violent series of pogroms against Catholics to break any potential resistance to the forthcoming partition of the country, and much of the violence was perpetrated by Protestant workers against fellow Catholics. Protestant working-class antipathy to the creation of an independent Ireland hadn't led them towards socialism as Connolly and MacAlpine naively hoped, but had left them prey to the worst enemies of socialism—the Unionist establishment.

So even before partition was imposed, the lesson should have been clear: socialists needed a strategy for winning Protestant workers away from Unionism so they became *participants* in the struggle for socialism and against imperialism. This, in turn, meant fighting the bigotry and sectarianism that Unionism created and relied on. But as the first CPI never gained a foothold in Belfast, whether it grasped this lesson or not, it was in no position to act on it.

As it took its stand against the treaty, the infant CP seemed to bend the stick very far in the opposite direction from where it had been heading in 1920. In its desperation to convince republicans to take it seriously, the CP declared:

We shall fight as actively as our means permit for an Irish Republic, for a Capitalist Irish Republic, for a Republic wherein we shall still be wage slaves, shall still be oppressed as a class, so long as this helps to destroy British Imperialism, the greatest enemy to world revolution. This fight will teach us and prepare us for our own coming class fight—our fight for a Workers' Republic.<sup>6</sup>

Given later Communist Party advocacy of a rigidly defined set of 'stages' that had to be gone through on the way to a socialist Ireland, it has to be said

that this was *not* what he first CPI was advocating. Even though the language seems remarkable, the communists saw the Irish revolution as a continuous process, carrying on *without interruption* to its socialist conclusion. So when they offered the republicans six of the eight pages of their *Workers' Republic* newspaper, it was in the belief that when the IRA distributed the paper to its 80,000 supporters, vast numbers would be won to the CPI after reading the *two* pages of superior communist arguments.

More broadly, there was another consideration in play as well. The Russian Revolution was increasingly isolated as the anticipated world revolution faltered. Britain had sent 60,000 troops to fight against the Bolsheviks, so a quick victory against imperialism in Ireland would be a huge fillip to the beleaguered Russian workers' state. And it has to be acknowledged that the Comintern fully endorsed the CPI strategy.

The communists failed to persuade the anti-treaty IRA to strike first, but when the Free State army went on the offensive against the republicans in June 1922, the CP did everything it could to encourage resistance and drive it leftwards. Armed CP members fought alongside the IRA in Dublin, and, with Comintern input, Connolly produced a radical social programme and tried (unsuccessfully) to persuade the IRA to adopt it as the only way to mobilise mass support vital for victory.<sup>7</sup>

When the IRA asked for help in rearming, Connolly went to Europe in search of weapons and tried to persuade the Comintern to foot the bill, telling its head, Zinoviev, that when he arrived back with a shipload of guns, this would produce 'a big development of the Party in Ireland' by 'converting masses of the Republican Army into communists'.<sup>8</sup> But the Russians, who by now had begun to seriously doubt the IRA's potential, refused to help, and Connolly's arms deal didn't materialise.

Under Connolly's leadership, the CPI had put all its eggs in the anti-imperialist basket—a perspective that, if appearing somewhat desperate, seemed to offer more immediate hope of success than a concentration on workers' economic struggles, which by the time the party was formed, had already passed

their peak. But in the end, Connolly's comrades held him responsible for the party's failure to gain the influence sought—and promised—among the IRA rank and file.<sup>9</sup>

The Communist International ordered a change of tactics: abandoning the republicans to their fate and adopting an industrial strategy instead.<sup>10</sup> By now, however, it was too late for the divided and still minuscule Communist Party to gain influence among workers who were in full retreat before a vicious Free State offensive against wages and conditions.

The CPI had undoubtedly made mistakes, but not in doubt either were its revolutionary credentials. It was a party that believed unwaveringly in working-class struggle from below to resolve the national issue and create a socialist society. It had no illusions about parliamentary democracy or the adaptability of existing state structures to serve working-class needs. After a false start, it had grasped the connection between anti-imperialism and socialism and rejected reformist, economic, and syndicalist notions that the anti-imperialist struggle could, or should, be left to nationalists.

The risks in its strategy were enormous, but so too was the potential prize. If the Free State could be defeated by workers mobilised for radical objectives, imperialism's grand design for Ireland would crumble, and with it partition, which was then still little more than a novel experiment with few committed supporters. A defeat for imperialism in Ireland would act, too, as a shot in the arm for the flagging world revolution.

The strategy failed, and the internal wrangles unleashed by the directive from Moscow to change course paralysed the party, leading the Comintern to intervene again, this time to order its dissolution.<sup>11</sup> The CPI was finally wound up in January 1924.<sup>12</sup>

By the time the Comintern got round to re-establishing a reliable communist presence in Ireland—the start of the 1930s—the entire *raison d'être* of the international communist movement had changed. Stalin, now ruling Russia with an iron fist, had declared that world revolution was no longer necessary for the communist project to succeed. Instead, he would build 'socialism in one country',

and as a consequence, the Comintern was transformed from the vanguard of international working-class revolution into the frontier guards of Russian state interests. The effects in Ireland, as elsewhere, were disastrous.

When the Revolutionary Workers' Groups emerged in Ireland in 1930, as forerunners to the second Communist Party, the Comintern was in the throes of a long period of ultra-left sectarianism, reflecting Stalin's domestic policy of forced collectivisation of the land and rapid industrial growth on the backs of a brutally exploited Russian working class.

The Comintern slogan of the era—'class against class'—had contradictory consequences for the re-emerging Irish communist movement. On the one hand it enabled a concise analysis of the alignment of class interests in the now stabilised Free State, and particularly the role being played by the newly created Fianna Fáil party, while on the other hand it ensured the communists remained isolated from the labour movement at large, thanks to their political sectarianism.

RWG leader Seán Murray spelled out the RWG's attitude to the national question:

The Irish bourgeoisie are no longer 'oppressed' by British imperialism, but are ruling Ireland, North and South, in alliance with British capitalism... They have abandoned the struggle for a Republic... Not a single move can now be made for independence without a struggle to overthrow the Irish capitalist class... [which] means, obviously, the establishment of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat... This means that the old slogans... of 'Ireland against England', 'Independence', 'Republic', must now be replaced by the slogan of class against class.<sup>13</sup>

When Tom Bell, the leading Comintern agent assigned to help build the RWG, applied the reasoning to Fianna Fáil, he concluded that de Valera had entered the Dáil in 1927 'not to continue the struggle against British imperialism, but to liquidate the last remnants of that struggle'. In so far as de Valera 'continues to make gestures of opposition to

imperialism', he did so only 'to retain support and keep alive the pretence of fighting.'<sup>14</sup>

This was probably as close as the communists got to understanding Fianna Fáil as a populist party willing to stir up discontent over the 1921 pro-imperialist settlement while resolutely blocking any resumption of anti-imperialist struggle. There was no doubt whatever that Fianna Fáil, and the section of the Irish capitalist class that it represented, had abandoned the *fight* against imperialism, even if it still sought concessions from Britain.

The RWG's message was clear: the working class could not rely on de Valera and Fianna Fáil to resolve the national question. The answer lay not in the incorporation of the North into the South—Dev's perspective (in theory if not practice)—but in a unified thirty-two-county struggle against the capitalist rulers north and south with socialist politics to the fore.

So arguing, the communists took on the fight against capitalism, native and foreign, north and south, Orange and Green, simultaneously and without distinction. In the North in particular, the results were spectacular, as the Belfast RWG, after two years of solid groundwork, emerged in the leadership of a mass-based fight against inadequate unemployment benefit. The Outdoor Relief Workers' strike, which brought tens of thousands of workers onto the streets, culminated in two days of dramatic street fighting with Protestant and Catholic workers arm in arm as the police attacked with batons and guns. Two workers were shot dead—one Catholic and one Protestant—and 100,000 people attended their funerals.<sup>15</sup> The Belfast Trades Council, which had opposed the strike, intervened and negotiated a settlement that fell short of what had been demanded but which was nonetheless claimed by the RWG as a great victory.

But there was a critical weakness in the communist analysis that helped prevent this show of non-sectarian solidarity from being consolidated into something more enduring. In line with Comintern dogma, the RWG assumed—wrongly—that the working class was straining at the leash to make the revolution. 'Decisive struggles for the dictatorship

of the proletariat are near at hand', the RWG declared as the Belfast struggle neared its climax.<sup>16</sup> The revolution was held back only by the reformist leaders of the labour movement, whom the RWG dubbed 'social fascists'.

Applying this false appraisal to the Protestant workers who had been fighting the police, the communists concluded that they 'were up in revolt against the British Empire and all that the Empire stood for'.<sup>17</sup> 'Old differences and prejudices had vanished', declared the RWG, 'burnt out in a common suffering and need', while the strike itself 'signifies the beginning of a desperate struggle against the imperialists by the working population of the Six Counties.' 'Forward to a United Republic', the communists urged.<sup>18</sup> The British CP took an identical line, declaring—under the headline 'Catholics and Orangemen united against common imperialist enemy'—that the fight was for 'bread and independence'.

The fact that some unemployed Protestants were fighting the police, however, did not mean that they, let alone the Protestant working class as a whole—or even most of the Catholics who participated in the struggle—were fighting against partition or for socialism. The comment of William Close, a Shankill Road Protestant arrested during the rioting, probably summed up the attitude of many of his fellow fighters: 'It is very unfair', he complained, 'I am a loyalist.' In the subsequent elections to the Board of Guardians who administered the relief schemes, none of the unemployed movement's candidates were elected, but 29 Unionists were.

Yet, for all their shortcomings, the RWG had grasped the critical point—that working-class unity would come through grassroots struggle, not through the passing of platitudinous resolutions or formal organisational accord at a bureaucratic level in the labour movement. They also had a clear perspective on fighting against native Irish capitalism of the Fianna Fáil variety, critical if ending partition was to mean more than 'reintegrating the national territory'—a proposition that would be sure to alienate rather than inspire Protestant workers. But a willingness to participate in economic struggles on the part of Protestant workers could not be *assumed*

to lead automatically to opposition to partition. This was a difficult political fight for socialists, and it was one that could not be short-circuited by the mere incantation of revolutionary slogans.

But the revolutionary zeal of the early 1930s was soon to be jettisoned as the Comintern veered rightwards in the face of Hitler's rise to power in Germany in 1933 (an event helped in no small measure by the German Communist Party's ultra-leftism). After a brief flirtation with united fronts 'from below', the Comintern moved rapidly into the era of the Popular Front, reflecting Stalin's determination to secure anti-German alliances with the western capitalist democracies. One commentator summarised the consequences:

The idea of proletarian revolution receded far into the background so as to become indistinguishable; the support of Russian foreign policy became the openly admitted paramount aim of world communism. Instead of the class struggle, co-operation with the bourgeoisie. Instead of the Soviet system, eulogy of democracy. Instead of internationalism, nationalism.<sup>19</sup>This would be the fate of the second Communist Party of Ireland, formed out of the Revolutionary Workers' Groups in June 1933, just months after Hitler came to power.

In fact, it could be argued that the Irish communists had adopted elements of the Popular Front approach—a softness towards Fianna Fáil—long before it was official policy. In September 1932, for example, their political masters in the Comintern accused the Irish comrades of 'wallowing in the petty-bourgeois confusionism of the republicans', and of 'dragging at the tail of Fianna Fáil and the IRA' by their policy of urging de Valera and the IRA 'to lead a mass struggle instead of showing that they will not do that.'<sup>20</sup> This divergence between the Comintern and CPI came to a head during the 1934 Republican Congress, a mass-based united front involving left-wing republicans, communists, and socialists.

Many congress activists wanted it to declare for the Workers' Republic, and one significant feature of the movement was that it had attracted the support of a number of Belfast Protestant workers, radicalised during the unemployment struggles. In June 1934

the Belfast supporters joined the annual Wolfe Tone commemoration, their banner inscribed, 'Break the Connection with Capitalism. Connolly's Message, Our Ideal. On to the Workers' Republic'.

The *Irish Independent* said 500 workers had come from Belfast, 'composed largely of Protestants and Presbyterians drawn in the main from the Orange districts.' One of them, Robert McVicker, said they aimed 'to break all connection with England and to smash Irish capitalism.'<sup>21</sup>

This was the first time that Protestant workers had organised in this way to join workers in the South to fight for a socialist solution to the national question, and one of the Workers' Republic faction in Congress explained the appeal:

Sectarianism dies out slowly when the fight against it is one of words. Sectarianism burns out quickly where there is team work in common struggle. Those who see in Partition just a reflex of sectarian strife see no way forward except in foolish talk about toleration, charity, real religion, etc. Those who see in Partition the link between Irish capitalism and Imperialist finance, see in the common struggle for the Workers' Republic the solution to Partition, and in the destruction of exploitation, the withering away of sectarian strife.<sup>22</sup>

However, when the congress met in full session to decide on its political strategy, the Communist Party—the largest organised grouping with decisive voting power—voted *against* calling for a Workers' Republic. The CP voted as it did, in part at least, to prevent the formation of a new revolutionary socialist party that the advocates of the Workers' Republic also proposed, but what is clear, too, is that by September 1934 the CPI had abandoned the belief that the fight for a Workers' Republic was the only way to end partition and resolve the national question. As CPI leader Sean Murray explained: 'Congress should stand for an Irish Republic. I say you cannot smash capitalism until you get rid of British imperialism.'<sup>23</sup> The CP had adopted a 'stages' approach: the republic they were now proposing was a *capitalist* republic—seen as an essential stage that had to be gone through

before the fight for socialism could commence.

Documents in the Comintern archives show that Murray's Moscow handlers had issued instruction that the CPI was to advocate a *Workers' and Farmers' Republic* as a compromise, but CPGB leader Harry Pollitt failed to pass on the Comintern's instructions. Labour historian Emmett O'Connor has gone so far as to blame Pollitt for wrecking the Republican Congress,<sup>24</sup> but even if the instructions had got to Murray, the CPI's rightward drift—which was quite in line with much bigger Comintern objectives that would soon become apparent—was already set in stone.

When it opted for the Republic as its goal, rather than the Workers' Republic, there was an acknowledgement that this would mean sacrificing the support of Protestant workers. The left-republican George Gilmore, whom the CPI supported, tried to justify this when he argued that

the carefully nurtured hostility [of Protestant workers] to Irish independence would not be eliminated by a change of phrasing. Those who might venture towards us in that mood were, for the most part, people who were trying to be radicals without accepting the anti imperialist struggle.<sup>25</sup>

But it was wrong to dismiss the call for a Workers' Republic as merely a 'change in phrasing'. There was a huge gulf between how socialists would organise and fight if they had a thirty-two-county *Workers' Republic* as their objective rather than a thirty-two-county *capitalist Republic*. It wasn't the slogan that was going to attract Protestant workers but the struggles it inspired.

Critical to this difference was the attitude that was to be taken towards Fianna Fáil. Under the Comintern's new rubric of the Popular Front—formally endorsed at its 1935 congress (which also happened to be its last)—the CPI was now *ordered* to do what it had been edging towards for some time: seek alliances with Fianna Fáil and encourage de Valera to lead the anti-imperialist struggle.

The timing couldn't have been worse as this was the very moment when de Valera was moving towards an open *accommodation* with British imperialism through the 'Coal and Cattle Pact' that went hand in hand with the banning of the IRA and the establishment of military tribunals to imprison republican militants. As the jails filled up, the new-look CPI called only for an inspection into prison conditions. The openly declared aim now was to 'make Fianna Fáil fight' rather than to fight Fianna Fáil.<sup>26</sup>

Yet despite the new approach, the CP took one last, if short-lived, principled position when it opposed de Valera's 1937 Constitution because of its undertones of 'clerical fascism'. Its irredentist claim on the six Counties was singled out for special criticism:

De Valera and the Catholic Hierarchy are evidently determined to prove to the Northern masses that union with their fellow-countrymen of the South does mean that they will be placed under the heel of the Vatican. The Protestant masses will never accept this and rightfully so.<sup>27</sup>

It wasn't long before the Protestant masses had an opportunity to express their opinion. In the depths of a severe economic depression, and campaigning solely against Dev's 'Catholic Constitution', the Unionist Party increased its vote in the February 1938 Stormont elections from 72,000 (in 1933) to 186,000. Possibly more than any other single factor since 1921, the 1937 Constitution cemented Protestant working-class support for partition, yet the communists, desperate to cosy up to Fianna Fáil in pursuit of the Popular Front, soon abandoned their criticisms.

By early 1939, the British representative at the Comintern, Johnny Campbell, was describing earlier CPI opposition to the constitution as 'a gross sectarian blunder' because the constitution

made Southern Ireland as independent as it is possible to be, [and left just] one important phase of the national struggle to be accomplished, i.e. the incorporation of the six northern counties into a united Irish Government.

Although Campbell believed ‘the Protestant population would resist [this] by force of arms’ because of their ‘fear of the domination of Ireland by Catholic clericalism’, he nevertheless argued that Fianna Fáil, who ‘represent the most progressive section of the people in Southern Ireland’, had the right policy for ending partition: asking the British government to persuade the Unionists to negotiate reunification.<sup>28</sup>

Once Ireland was united by government proclamation, the CPI argued, it would be able to join the coming ‘war for democracy’ on Britain’s side. But just as the CPI embraced de Valera fully, Fianna Fáil introduced the Offences against the State Act and started interning republicans. The CP refused to oppose growing repression on the grounds that the IRA’s recently launched English bombing campaign was ‘helping Hitler’.

But the CP’s acrobatics were only just beginning. When Russia signed a non-aggression pact with Hitler in August 1939, and Britain and Germany went to war the following month, Britain was once again denounced as Ireland’s imperialist enemy while the IRA’s campaign was held to be ‘in a definite and imperishable cause, none other than the liberation of a nation’.<sup>29</sup> Rather than getting the South into the war, the aim was now to get the North out of it.

The final twist came when Germany attacked Russia in 1941. Overnight, in the eyes of the CPI—and by virtue of being on the same side as Russia—Britain was now fighting for democracy. Opposition to the Unionist regime ended as the party gave its full support to the war effort, opposing strikes and allegedly acting as police informers against republicans.

In the South, the CP now wanted a pro-war government that would bring the twenty-six counties into the conflict on Britain’s side, but this policy was so unpopular that the decision was taken to liquidate what remained of the party in Dublin and argue the pro-war case from within the Labour Party.<sup>30</sup> The six county rump was rechristened the Communist Party of Northern Ireland, which garnered support among Protestant workers on the basis of its pro-war, pro-British stance—support that quickly evaporated once

the real war ended and the Cold War began.

For the next three decades the CPNI was, in effect, a partitionist party, made up almost entirely of Protestant workers with a toehold in the trade union bureaucracy. It campaigned, moderately, on bread and butter issues and, more broadly, to make Northern Ireland ‘progressive’, but did nothing to challenge loyalism or the sectarian structures that underpinned the northern state.<sup>31</sup> South of the border the party—reborn in 1948 as the Irish Workers’ League, later Party—saw its role primarily as that of defending native capitalism against foreign encroachments. For the communists, north and south, the notion of a common struggle from below for a united socialist Ireland was banished as ‘ultra-leftism’. As a result of the communists’ vehement rejection of revolutionary politics, when the conflict in the North erupted in 1968, there was a vacuum on the left, leaving the way clear for the Provisional IRA to define the parameters of the struggle. Over half a century later, we are still living with the dire consequences.

## NOTES

1. *Workers Republic*, 17 December 1921.
2. The CPI strategy is most clearly spelled out in its reports to the Comintern. See for example, George McLay’s report to the ECCI, 31 August 1922 in the Comintern Archive, henceforth RGASPI: 495/89/12/39-46, and Report of the CPI to the ECCI October 1921 to October 1922, RGASPI, 495/89/16/41-80.
3. Lenin, V.I. (1965) *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, Moscow: Progress Publishers, pp. 144-151.
4. Connolly, R. and MacAlpine, E. (1920) ‘Confidential Report on the Situation in Ireland’, 7 July, Comintern Archives, RGASPI, 495/89/2/8-15
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Workers’ Republic*, 12 November, 1921.
7. The social programme was published in *Workers’ Republic*, 12 August 1922.
8. Connolly to Louise, 22 August 1922, RGASPI, 495/89/12/36.
9. ‘Report of the first Annual Congress of the Communist Party of Ireland held on 20th and 21st January 1923’, Comintern Archive, RGASPI, 495/89/21/1-5.

10. 'Resolution of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International on the Irish Question', 12 December 1922, Comintern Archive, RGASPI, 495/89/11/6-7.
11. The CPGB urged the Comintern to dissolve the CPI, but there is no record of an actual instruction from the Comintern to this effect. However, in later communications with Ireland, the Comintern stated that it had 'dissolved the small Communist Party of Ireland'. See *Workers' Republic*, 2 April 1927.
12. George McLay, CPI treasurer, said that 'although it lingered until Jany [sic] 1924 the CPI really had ceased to function properly long before that.' 'Report on the Situation in Ireland', 26 June 1924, RGASPI, 495/89/27/12-14.
13. *Workers' Voice*, 19 July 1930.
14. Bell, T. (1930) 'The Situation in Ireland', *Labour Monthly*, February.
15. For a full account of these events, their background, and aftermath, see Mitchell, S. (2017) *Struggle or Starve: Working Class Unity in Belfast's 1932 Outdoor Relief Riots*, Chicago: Haymarket Books
16. *Irish Workers' Voice*, 8 October 1932.
17. Quoted in *Belfast Newsletter*, 11 October 1932.
18. *Irish Workers' Voice*, op. cit.
19. Borkenau, F. (1971) *World Communism*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 387-88.
20. Correspondence from the Anglo American Secretariat of the ECCI to the Revolutionary Workers Groups, 17 and 19 September, 1932, RGASPI, 495/89/75/21-29a.
21. *Irish Independent*, 19 June 1934.
22. *Republican Congress*, 23 June 1934.
23. *ibid.*
24. *Republican Congress*, 13 October 1934.
25. O'Connor, E. (2004) *Reds and the Green: Ireland, Russia and the Communist Internationals 1919-43*, Dublin: UCD Press, p. 201.
26. Gilmore, G. (1968) *1934 Republican Congress*, Dublin: Dochas Co-op Society, p. 56.
27. *Worker*, 22 August 1936.
28. *Inprecorr*, 5 June 1937.
29. Campbell, J.R. (1939) 'The Situation in Ireland', 27 February, RGASPI 494/14/340/10-38.
30. *Irish Workers Weekly*, 10 February 1940.
31. A detailed account of the liquidation of the CP in Dublin is given in Burns, T. (1943) 'Labour's Opportunity in Ireland', *Workers' International News*, February/March.
32. See, for example, *Ulster and the New Britain*, resolutions and discussion of the Communist Congress, Belfast, March 1945, CP, Belfast